Nuclear waste to nuclear reactor: The case of Russia in Kazakhstan

After shutting down its last Soviet-era reactor in 1999, Kazakhstan is now on the cusp of returning to nuclear energy. Long reliant on non-renewables and electricity imports, the country faces rising energy demands and an urgent need to diversify its energy sources.

In October 2024, a national referendum strongly backed the construction of a nuclear power plant, with Russia’s Rosatom ultimately selected to lead the project. The decision marks a major shift in the country’s energy strategy and reaffirms Russia’s enduring influence in Central Asia’s high-stakes infrastructure sector.

However, the decision raises several concerns, including environmental risks, increased energy dependence on Russia, and the revival of unsettling memories of Soviet-era nuclear contamination in Kazakhstan. Understanding why Kazakhstan is turning back to nuclear power and why it chose Russia for its first Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)merits a closer look at the strategic and geopolitical factors behind this move.

Nuclear past, nuclear future

Kazakhstan’s journey with nuclear technology is fraught and painful. As a Soviet republic, it served as a major testing ground, most notably at the Semipalatinsk Test Site, where more than 450 atmospheric and underground nuclear detonations took place. This placed a heavy toll on the environment of Kazakhstan, without the nuclear waste having been taken care of by the Soviet Union.

From 1979 to 1999, Kazakhstan hosted a high-neutron Soviet nuclear power plant. After independence in 1991, Kazakhstan dismantled its arsenal and embraced nuclear non-proliferation with the Semipalatinsk test site closing in the same year.

Now, facing power deficits, it is returning to nuclear power for civilian use. The new plant will be built near the village of Ulken by Lake Balkhash – a site chosen for its geographical viability, including proximity to water access. However, environmental concerns persist. Kazakhstan lacks the domestic capacity to manage nuclear waste and must rely on external actors. Despite its past role in Kazakhstan’s nuclear contamination, Russia has reemerged as a key partner in the country’s nuclear revival.

Illusion of a consortium

Astana designated Rosatom to lead the construction of its first NPPafter a competitive bidding process involving China’s China National Nuclear Commission (CNNC), France’s Electricité de France (EDF), and Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power. While authorities claim the formation of an international consortium, Rosatom remains the undisputed leader, reflecting both its technological edge and Moscow’s strategic weight in Astana. Kazakhstan claims that it is the exclusive owner, operator, and supplier of uranium fuel, with complete control over the technological processes of its upcoming nuclear power plant.

Meanwhile, China has been selected to lead the second nuclear power plant, with feasibility studies underway. Kazakhstani officials argue that China is best suited to cooperate with Russia, given their regional rapport. Though framed as multinational, the consortium appears largely symbolic, aimed at balancing ties with major powers. Rosatom’s financing offer further tightens Russia’s grip on Kazakhstan’s energy future.

Why Russia?

Kazakhstan’s decision to shift to nuclear power comes amid a growing electricity production deficit. The country faces a projected shortfall of over 6 GW by 2030, making energy security urgent. The selection of Rosatom to carry out the construction is officially justified by Kazakhstani authorities, given Russia’s global leadership in nuclear technology and its advanced VVER 3+ generation reactors, which are already in operation across several domestic and international sites. Rosatom was deemed to have submitted “the most optimal and advantageous proposal.”

This outcome is not surprising. Talks between Kazakhstan and Russia on nuclear cooperation began in 2011, leading to a feasibility study and a series of agreements. In 2014, an MoU was signed for constructing a VVER-based plant with a capacity of up to 1200 MWe. Kazakhstan also holds a 25% stake in parts of Russia’s nuclear energy sector, and Rosatom’s subsidiary, Uranium One, is already active in Kazakhstan’s uranium mining. Additionally, Russia was Kazakhstan’s top electricity supplier in 2024, exporting 4.6 billion kWh.

Kazakhstan’s alignment with Russia reflects shared Soviet-era technical standards, institutional continuity, and a workforce fluent in the Russian system. Rosatom’s reactors are cost-effective, geographically proximate, and supported by uranium supply and tech transfer offers. Russian remains a common language among elites, and Rosatom’s regional presence, including in Uzbekistan, adds further appeal.

As Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector is dominated by Western companies (such as ENI, Shell and Chevron, and Russian Lukoil only having 13% stakes in Kashagan Oil Field), choosing Russia for nuclear energy helps Astana maintain a strategic balance and avoid overdependence on any one bloc, without triggering Western sanctions, as Rosatom remains unsanctioned.

Balancing act

Kazakhstan’s decision to pursue nuclear power under Rosatom’s leadership marks a turning point in both its energy strategy and ties with Russia. While the project aims to ease electricity shortages and boost Kazakhstan’s global energy profile, it also deepens reliance on Russia, whose regional influence had waned after the Ukraine crisis.

Although Kazakhstan seeks diverse partnerships – “middle power” diplomacy being a recent focus – geographic and historical ties continue to draw it toward Moscow. The inclusion of other countries in the proposed consortium reflects Astana’s multi-vector foreign policy, an attempt to maintain geopolitical flexibility while meeting infrastructure needs. As the consortium’s lead, Rosatom reinforces its influence over the region’s energy and political landscape. Yet, Kazakhstan’s visible effort to balance Russia and China suggests it won’t sideline either in its strategically vital energy sector.