A treaty-based approach risks exacerbating resistance among regional actors, undermining the legitimacy of such arrangements and failing to deliver measurable improvements in deterrence. Instead of resolving strategic ambiguity, a treaty-based framework might provoke tensions, diminish regional buy-in, and create a false sense of security.
The Indo-Pacific’s political, cultural and strategic diversity means flexibility and adaptability are essential. Security cooperation must accommodate varying levels of commitment, operational capacity, and willingness among participants. Imposing a uniform structure carries the risk of alienating key partners and reducing the effectiveness of regional security efforts.
What matters is how states work together in practice. In this way, it is helpful to conceptualise Indo-Pacific security cooperation as a layered process rather than a linear progression from informality to formality.
At the core of Indo-Pacific collective defence is a highly aligned trilateral framework between the United States, Japan and Australia. This core group provides a strong foundation for deeper cooperation, building on shared interests, high levels of interoperability and longstanding defence relationships.
Beyond this, functional, modular and mission-oriented mechanisms – such as the Enforcement Coordination Cell (ECC) – offer a flexible, scalable model for expanding cooperation. These mechanisms focus on specific tasks or missions, such as sanctions enforcement or maritime surveillance, and can adapt to circumstances without requiring commitment to a single, rigid structure. Mechanisms of this type are more compatible with Southeast Asian perspectives – avoiding the binary choice between alignment and non-alignment – and create space for engagement without forcing countries into formal blocs.
The layered model enables “minilateralism”, cooperation among small groups of like-minded countries tailored to particular issues or contingencies. The ECC, Bilateral Intelligence Analysis Cell in Yokota Air Base and US-Philippine Combined Coordination Centre near Manila exemplify how partners can integrate intelligence-sharing and operational analysis without requiring a comprehensive treaty framework. This approach recognises that not all regional actors share the same threat perceptions or strategic priorities. It delivers something formal structures often struggle to provide: operational integration.
The future of Indo-Pacific security cooperation will depend less on institutional form than on operational credibility and regional legitimacy. Recent crisis simulations involving the United States, Japan, and Australia suggest that even highly aligned partners with strong institutional understanding do not always respond in a coordinated or predictable way under pressure, with differences in risk tolerance, economic priorities, and crisis management approaches. While the desire for stronger collective defence is understandable, replicating alliance models from other regions is unlikely to succeed in the Indo-Pacific context.
Indo-Pacific security cooperation depends less on what states promise on paper than on what they can deliver together in practice. The layered approach – anchored by a strong core group and augmented by flexible, mission-oriented arrangements – offers a pragmatic pathway in a region marked by complexity and uncertainty. This approach is not a retreat from ambition, nor does it preclude the possibility of greater formalisation in the future. But for now, security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific will be measured not by the existence of treaties, but by the ability of regional states to act together when it matters.