PACOM is back – but it never went away

The eight years of INDOPACOM are over. In a short press release, the US Department of Defence – presently styled as the Department of War – has announced (Opens in new window) that its largest theatre command is reverting to the name PACOM, as it was when established in 1947.

It is not entirely clear why this decision was taken. Had it been a Biden-era change to the “Indo–Pacific” designation, the move would be less surprising. That the original decision was taken by the first Trump administration is what raises eyebrows.

The 2018 change of name was an exercise in signalling and public diplomacy rather than any grand strategic reorientation. PACOM has always had a theatre of operation that spanned from Hawaii to the western reaches of the Indian Ocean. The first Trump administration embraced the Indo–Pacific nomenclature in 2017 at the APEC Summit, and it has been anchored in Washington’s strategic policy and public rhetoric ever since.

The motive for adopting this not-so-new concept – it was widely used in Australia in the 19th century – was the recognition of the growing connectivity of the Indian Ocean region and the Western Pacific. It was seen as foregrounding the growing strategic ties between the United States and its allies and traditionally non-aligned India as part of a larger effort to manage the destabilising actions of a rising China.

In spite of adopting the strategic construct and rebranding the huge operational command, the substance of US strategy in Asia did not really change. Washington’s approach to the region continued to be primarily focused on the Western Pacific.

The Indo–Pacific moniker has become widespread – Australia, Japan, South Korea as well as many European countries use it to describe the region – and even ASEAN felt compelled to respond (Opens in new window) to this discursive shift. Yet it is difficult to discern a distinctively Indo-Pacific strategic policy in the approach these countries take. Australia, for one, speaks about an Indo–Pacific, but apart from a strengthened and more consistent approach toward India, its foreign policy has been notable for a renewed focus on the narrower aperture of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.

Several reasons might explain why the US military has taken this decision. The deterioration in US–India relations might be here to stay – and without a focus on India, the Indo–Pacific frame of reference makes little sense. The change may also reflect the warming of ties with China and could be seen in the light of the new era of what has been termed “constructive strategic stability (Opens in new window)”.

Close observers of Donald Trump remind us to judge the president not by what he says but by what he does. This applies to the use of novel strategic constructs. When the test of action is put to the adoption of the Indo–Pacific label, most countries are found wanting. Perhaps the Trump administration is, for once, aligning its words with its deeds.