Australia, explained.
Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles (L) with PNG Minister for Defence Billy Joseph during the Defence Minsters' Meeting in Brisbane, 20 February 2025 (Nicole Mankowski/Defence Images)
PNG’s sovereignty need not come at the cost of the safety and well-being of its own people.
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Papua New Guinea: Shhhhh … don’t use the word “Alliance”Papua New Guinea: Shhhhh … don’t use the word “Alliance”
Australia and Papua New Guinea have announced the beginning of negotiations for a bilateral defence treaty, despite having signed a landmark Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) just 14 months ago. This latest move poses three key questions: what are the differences between the two agreements; does the treaty add value; and what are the opportunities for both countries?
For PNG, opening the door for its inaugural defence treaty is an indication that it views Australia as its preferred security partner into the future. Australia, for its part, has stepped up its game in recent years to reclaim its prominence in the region. A defence treaty indicates a shift away from PNG’s “friends to all, enemies to none” foreign policy by having to choose its best friend.
While the BSA fell short of being a treaty-level document, it set the framework for a comprehensive approach to both traditional and non-traditional security threats. The existing military partnership is delivered through Australia’s Defence Cooperation Program, adding to the already high degree of integration and interoperability between both forces. PNG’s Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko has even stated that Australia is a security partner of choice. So, does the treaty finally put this in writing?
The complete value-add will be revealed as negotiations continue. For Australia, an elevation of partnership could be measured by an expression of exclusivity as PNG’s preferred security partner, precluding PNG from engaging in similar security deals with China. PNG has guarded this exclusivity since independence, and with more fervour during the heightened geopolitical tensions of the past decade.
Granting Australia that exclusivity of partnership is sure to come with a heavy price tag, especially if it is at the detriment of the relationship PNG has built with China as an economic and trading partner. The treaty may also explore the avenue for Papua New Guineans to enlist in the Australian Defence Force, amid Australia’s internal recruitment challenges.
PNG’s constitutional requirements dictate the treaty process and have already influenced the BSA’s status as a framework agreement, rather than a treaty.
According to PNG’s constitution, a treaty must be ratified by the PNG parliament but can only enter into force once it’s given effect by domestic law. Without specifics on the full scope of Australia–PNG cooperation, the treaty’s legal basis is unknown but is likely to involve future legislative amendments.
If this is the case, the PNG government shouldn’t stop there. Building on this momentum, it should explore other areas of legislative reform to give more power to its agencies in addressing emerging security threats.
A bill was tabled in the PNG parliament late last year to address domestic terrorism amid a wave of tribal conflict and civil unrest. The unrest has continued, with two horrifying attacks against women in Port Moresby in February, leading to a public outcry for stronger action and the removal of settlements in the capital city.
Serious thought must be given to introducing a new agency that is mandated to straddle that middle-ground between the police and military, such as a National Guard or Gendarmerie.
The efforts to launch a new National Security Policy and the counter-terrorism bill are attempts to improve internal coordination. But this will be the coordination of existing agencies that already have defined spheres of operations. Serious thought must be given to introducing a new agency that is mandated to straddle that middle-ground between the police and military, such as a National Guard or Gendarmerie. Initiatives falling short of this seem to be continued forms of political quibbling around the issue.
Considering the upcoming 50th anniversary of independence in September, and a consistent string of law-and-order challenges, the PNG government has an abundance of reasons to justify an overhaul of PNG’s security architecture. The PNG government should take advantage of the momentum from a new defence treaty to leverage expertise and resources to push for greater reform across its security landscape.
When entering into negotiations for security agreements, the default position is always that PNG will not sign an agreement that requires a change to its domestic laws. This approach is admirable and is seen as a way of protecting its “sovereignty” by not allowing external influence to dictate domestic affairs. Unfortunately, it can feel like the cost of sovereignty protection is the safety and well-being of the sovereign’s own people.
Unless PNG can address these shortcomings, facing evolving security threats over the next 50 years will be akin to entering a bareknuckle brawl with both hands tied behind its back. If the PNG government wants to craft a legacy in time for PNG’s 50th independence anniversary and curb the law-and-order issues that have its society in a chokehold, this is the way forward.
About the author
Oliver Nobetau
Oliver (Oli) Nobetau is Pacific Islands Program Director at the Lowy Institute.
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