Myanmar, explained.
This photo taken on 19 May 2026 shows members of the Mandalay People's Defence Forces (MDY-PDF) at a secret training camp in an undisclosed location in Myanmar's Sagaing Region (AFP via Getty Images)
Armed groups already govern, tax and judge in some regions; a settlement must share that power while protecting minorities’ rights.
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Rethinking Myanmar’s Union from the peripheryRethinking Myanmar’s Union from the periphery
For decades, federalism (Opens in new window) has been at the heart of Myanmar’s ethnic political struggle. Ethnic nationalities have demanded greater autonomy, while democratic forces have envisaged a federal democratic union in which power is shared between a national government and constituent states.
Five years of civil war have changed the reality behind the debate. The old assumption was that Myanmar’s future political order would necessarily be designed at the centre and that power would then be devolved to the states. Increasingly, the reverse is happening: political authority is emerging from the periphery, often without Naypyidaw.
The Arakan Army (Opens in new window) (AA) in Rakhine and powerful ethnic organisations in Shan State (Opens in new window) and other border areas now control substantial territory. They have established systems of administration (Opens in new window), taxation, justice, and security. In Rakhine, the AA (Opens in new window) has built parallel administrative, judicial, and security structures across much of the state. These are not simply demands for future autonomy. They are forms of government already operating on the ground.
This does not mean Myanmar is uniformly moving towards confederation, or that the war is nearing its end. The military continues to use force intensively. In the first half of 2026 alone, ACLED (Opens in new window) recorded more than 450 civilians killed in military-perpetrated mass killings, with nearly 40% of those deaths occurring in Anyar. Resistance actors, meanwhile, continue to pursue their aims through armed struggle.
Yet the war is also reshaping the political landscape that any future settlement will have to address. Armed actors are not only fighting for territory; they are governing parts of it, building institutions and exercising authority.
Diplomacy centred only on Naypyidaw risks overlooking important political realities on the ground.
The creation of the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (Opens in new window) (SCEF) in March 2026 illustrates the complexity. Resistance actors remain committed to a federal democratic union rather than abandoning federalism. Yet the SCEF reflects the growing importance of states and ethnic resistance organisations in shaping Myanmar’s future.
In some ethnic borderlands, political authority is becoming more consolidated at the local and state level. In Bamar-majority Anyar, (Opens in new window) resistance remains more fragmented, while civilians face intense military violence.
These developments suggest that Myanmar may not be moving from federalism to confederation so much as remaking federalism from the ground up. This matters because the country is not undergoing a single political transition. Different forms of authority are emerging across different parts of Myanmar, shaped by distinct experiences of conflict, governance, and autonomy.
The debate is also generational. Veteran leaders (Opens in new window) within organisations such as the Karen National Union remain committed to federalism. Younger activists (Opens in new window) and diaspora communities, however, increasingly question whether conventional federalism offers sufficient autonomy after decades of broken agreements, military rule, and failed peace processes.
A future settlement will have to accommodate these differences rather than impose a single institutional model from the capital. Myanmar may need a more flexible arrangement, combining different degrees of autonomy, stronger state-level authority, and negotiated power sharing between the union and territories that have developed substantial self-government.
Confederation may offer one possible bridge, but it is not a cure-all. Its greatest weakness could be the very autonomy that makes it attractive. Constituent territories could become so self-reliant that cooperation on national issues becomes difficult, producing fragmentation rather than union. Resource-rich areas controlling jade, hydropower, or major trade routes might resist fiscal redistribution, deepening regional inequalities. A weak common centre could also struggle to make decisions when constituent governments disagree.
There is a crucial rights dimension. Greater autonomy does not automatically mean greater inclusion. Rakhine makes this clear. Any future settlement must address not only the relationship between Rakhine and the union, but also the rights (Opens in new window) and political participation of minorities, including the Rohingya, within Rakhine. Decentralisation without strong rights protections could simply move exclusion from the national level to the local one.
The implications extend to ASEAN. The organisation has approached Myanmar primarily through the lens of the sovereign state and the Five-Point Consensus. But if political authority is increasingly dispersed among ethnic administrations and resistance territories, diplomacy centred only on Naypyidaw risks overlooking important political realities on the ground.
ASEAN is not in a position to prescribe Myanmar’s system of governance. It can, however, broaden its understanding of who will shape any eventual settlement. That means listening not only to the military and the National Unity Government but also to ethnic political organisations, resistance actors, women, youth, and civil society.
Engaging an ethnic administration does not mean recognising a new state, just as engaging resistance actors does not mean endorsing their territorial claims. It means acknowledging political realities on the ground rather than treating constitutional arrangements as if they already exist.
Myanmar’s future union will not be negotiated on an empty map, but among actors who, through five years of war, have acquired territory, built institutions, and developed their own claims to political authority. The challenge, therefore, is not simply to redistribute power from the centre. It is to find a way to share the power that has already emerged across the country.
About the author
Yuyun Wahyuningrum
Yuyun Wahyuningrum is Senior Fellow for Atrocity Prevention and Southeast Asia at the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, University of Queensland.
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