Australia, explained.
Australian soldiers, on the way to do some trench digging, welcome two Polish Independent Carpathian Rifles Brigade infantrymenduring the Siege of Tobruk, Libya, 1941 (W. G. Vanderson/Imperial War Museums via Getty Images)
A first-ever Polish defence attaché in Canberra marks the formalisation of a relationship built through war, migration and coalition service.
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Shared Solidarność: From Tobruk to CanberraShared Solidarność: From Tobruk to Canberra
Poland has established a permanent Defence Attaché presence in Canberra for the first time, shifting the role from Jakarta where it has historically covered the region. It is not the creation of a relationship, but a recognition of one that now warrants more direct and sustained attention. It reflects a shift in how ties are being prioritised.
The underlying connection long predates the structures now in place to formalise it.
The military relationship between Australia and Poland was forged during the siege of Tobruk in 1941. The Australian 9th Division, labelled “Rats” by German propaganda, adopted the term as a mark of defiance. As Australian forces were withdrawn, the defence of Tobruk passed to others, including the Polish Carpathian Brigade, who went on to hold the port under the same conditions of siege. This was a shared experience, reflected in Poland’s award of the Virtuti Militari to Australia’s Major General Leslie Morshead, whose command at Tobruk included the Polish contingent.
In the years following the war, Australian veterans sponsored the migration of displaced Polish soldiers, many of whom could not return to a Soviet-controlled homeland. The relationship that followed was sustained through people, memory, and periodic contact, rather than through formal defence engagement.
The relationship did not lack substance, only sustained attention.
Following the end of communist rule, the conditions for a more direct military relationship began to emerge.
Engagement resumed, but largely within coalition frameworks rather than through a sustained bilateral structure. The Middle East conflicts of the early 2000s provided opportunities for alignment, including Poland’s command of the Multinational Division Central-South in Iraq, alongside Australian contributions. These experiences reinforced compatibility, but did not translate into a consistently developed relationship in their own right.
The presence of a Defence Attaché accredited to Australia from Jakarta provided a degree of representation. The foundation was always there. The constant focus that comes with a resident Defence Attaché was not.
The decision to establish a dedicated presence reflects a change in how the relationship is being viewed. It is, in part, a recognition by Poland of Australia’s role beyond its immediate region, but also an acknowledgement that the relationship itself has matured to a point where episodic engagement is no longer sufficient. This shift has been building over recent years.
Australia’s contribution to support Ukraine has brought Australian and Polish personnel into more regular contact in a training environment. More recently, the deployment of the Boeing E-7A Wedgetail to Poland extended that interaction into an operational setting. Operating from mid-2025, the aircraft supported NATO surveillance and early warning functions, contributing to the protection of logistics flows into Ukraine and integrating with allied systems.
This was not routine interoperability. It reflected a level of trust built over time.
The contingent deployed to Poland with a Royal Australian Air Force E-7A Wedgetail aircraft from July to October 2025 to provide surveillance, communications and early warning on threats against supply lines taking international aid to Ukraine (Kylie Jagiello/Defence Imagery)
That growing tempo of the relationship has also been reflected in senior-level engagement, including by the ADF’s Chief of Joint Operations, Vice Admiral Justin Jones, in meetings with Polish counterparts during Australia’s Operation Kudu activity in Europe in support of Ukraine.
The relationship did not lack substance, only sustained attention. An in-country Defence Attaché provides a mechanism for routine engagement between defence organisations and access to decision-making processes. It allows the relationship to be worked continually, rather than revisited.
Since 2014, Poland has expanded defence spending, accelerated modernisation, and taken on a more active role within NATO. Its ambition to increase both the scale and readiness of its armed forces – predominantly drawing on United States, South Korean and indigenous platforms – sits alongside a broader regional outlook, including the evolution of the Intermarium concept into the Three Seas Initiative. This reflects a nation seeking not only to secure its immediate flank, but to shape the wider strategic environment in which it operates.
Australia operates in a different geography, but the strategic logic is not dissimilar. Australia is a maritime nation with no land borders, focused on securing its northern approaches and the integrity of its trade routes. Poland is a continental state with limited strategic depth, focused on deterring threats along its eastern flank. One looks north into the Indo-Pacific; the other looks east into Europe.
Both are regional middle powers with strong links to the United States. Both operate within alliance frameworks while seeking to retain credible sovereign capability. Both face persistent pressure from state actors operating across military, cyber, and information domains. Both have experienced the gap between recognising risk and acting on it. Poland has now moved quickly to translate that warning into capability.
Within that setting, the next steps are relatively clear, even if they are not yet formalised.
A dedicated Defence Attaché provides opportunity. The logical progression is greater depth: exchange postings between respective headquarters, attendance at reciprocal war colleges, and, over time, consideration of a reciprocal Australian Defence Attaché position in Warsaw. These are not ambitious measures. They are practical ones that convert familiarity into routine cooperation.
The relationship itself is not new. What is changing is the degree of intent behind it. The legacy of the “Rats of Tobruk” has endured across history, migration, and coalition service. The difference now is that it is being applied.
About the author
Paul Pelczar
Paul Pelczar OAM has broad experience in intelligence, cyber and information operations across joint and maritime environments.
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