China

One of the most dramatic shifts over the 20-year history of the Lowy Institute Poll has been in Australian attitudes towards China. In 2016, China topped the list for ‘Australia’s best friend in Asia’. Today, trust in China and confidence in its leader remain at a fraction of previous levels.

This reflects a turbulent period in Australia–China relations that began around 2016 as Canberra became more forthright regarding its concerns about the Chinese government’s intentions in the region and allegations of interference in Australian politics. China responded by freezing high-level contact from 2020, and later by imposing a range of coercive trade measures against Australia.

The 2022 election of the Albanese Labor government in Australia provided a circuit breaker. Over the past two years, Australia and China have re-engaged at a political level, with leaders and foreign and trade ministers meeting their counterparts on several occasions. Beijing has progressively lifted trade blockages, and in late 2023 released Australian journalist Cheng Lei from detention. Australian officials cautiously refer to this current phase of the relationship as ‘stabilisation’, while Chinese officials have more optimistically described it as an ‘improvement’.

China: economic partner or security threat?

Changing public attitudes towards China are particularly evident on the question of whether Australians see China as more of an economic partner or security threat.

Up until 2020, the most prevalent view was that China was more of an economic partner than it was a military or security^* threat to Australia. This flipped in 2021, at the nadir of the political relationship and while Beijing’s trade restrictions were in full force. Then, a clear majority (63%) saw China more as a security threat, while only one-third (34%) saw China as more of an economic partner, a trend that held steady in 2022. The following year, as the relationship began to thaw, threat perceptions mellowed, and public opinion moved back towards a more even split between the two views.

In 2024, public attitudes appear to have plateaued rather than rebounded to the relative positivity of last decade. Slightly more than half of Australians (53%) now see China as more of a security threat, while 44% see it as more of an economic partner — results that have held steady from 2023.

China as a military threat

When looking to the future, threat perceptions of China are more widespread. A strong majority of Australians (71%) continue to think it ‘somewhat likely’ or ‘very likely’ that China will become a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years. While this is a four-point drop from last year, it still stands in marked contrast to 2018, when less than half (45%) perceived China as a future military threat.

Australia–China relations

The Australian public is divided on the current state of the bilateral relationship, with those who describe it as ‘quite bad’ (47%) slightly outnumbering those who see it as ‘quite good’ (43%). Stronger views are in the small minority — only 6% describe the relationship as ‘very bad’, and almost none (1%) as ‘very good’.

China: emphasis on deterrence or stability

In recent years, successive Australian governments have pursued a defence strategy that seeks to deter China from altering the status quo in the Indo-Pacific by using military force. The elevated role of deterrence is evident in the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) partnership, which includes a plan to equip Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, and was made explicit in the 2024 National Defence Strategy (released after the completion of fieldwork for this Poll), which states “deterrence is now Australia’s primary strategic defence objective”.^*

In parallel to its deterrence strategy, the current Australian government has pursued a diplomatic policy of ‘stabilisation’ and reassurance towards China. This involves consistent official messaging on enduring areas of concern, clarity that Australia is seeking peace and stability in the region, and an openness to cooperation in specific areas.

Deterrence and stable engagement are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the Australian government has underlined its belief that these two tracks can reinforce each other. But so too can they undermine each other — a strong emphasis on deterrence could impact on the stability of the relationship, while a strong emphasis on stability may lessen the appetite to participate in some forms of deterrence.

In 2024, half of all Australians (51%) say Australia should place more importance on a stable relationship with China than working with allies to deter China’s use of military force. A slightly lower proportion (45%) say that Australia should place more importance on deterring China’s use of military force, even if it means harming Australia’s relationship with China.