Vietnam, explained.
Vietnam's President To Lam has maintained a packed diplomatic travel schedule (Rolex Dela Pena via Getty Images)
Australia and Vietnam are drawing closer not out of shared strategy but shared uncertainty about the great powers.
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To Lam heads to Australia – but Vietnam still won’t pick a sideTo Lam heads to Australia – but Vietnam still won’t pick a side
Vietnam’s leader To Lam will reportedly travel (Opens in new window) to Australia soon – though details are not publicly confirmed. A visit will build on steady progress in the Australia–Vietnam relationship, upgraded to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2024. This growing convergence is emblematic of stronger middle power ties globally as the United States rejects the multilateral and rules-based order it helped to create, leaving allies and partners seeking alternatives.
Since assuming the top leadership position of General Secretary in 2024, To Lam has maintained a packed diplomatic travel schedule and considerably expanded Hanoi’s diversification strategy (Opens in new window). His first trip was to China, a signal of his commitment to Vietnam’s most important partner. The following month he travelled to the United States to attend the United Nations General Assembly in New York. He has also made three trips to Laos and two to Cambodia, indicating the strength of Vietnam’s ties to mainland Southeast Asian neighbours.
In February 2026, To Lam visited Washington to attend (Opens in new window) the inaugural meeting of US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace. Between April and June, To Lam went to China, India, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.
Hanoi is averse to alliances and will continue to prioritise its relationship with China, with whom it shares a border and a complicated history.
Hanoi has also hosted numerous heads of state, including Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi (Opens in new window), South Korea’s President Lee Jae Myung (Opens in new window), Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. (Opens in new window), China’s leader Xi Jinping (Opens in new window), and Russian President Vladimir Putin (Opens in new window).
Faced with an unreliable (Opens in new window) United States and lingering tensions between the world’s two largest powers (Opens in new window), the United States and China, middle powers including Australia and Vietnam are looking to one another (Opens in new window) as a hedge against geopolitical volatility. Both countries want to preserve (Opens in new window) a stable balance of power in the Pacific and prevent the emergence of any single power (Opens in new window) dominating the region. But their views and interests diverge in notable ways.
Australia supports an active forward US military presence in the region. For more than half a century, Canberra has relied on the United States as its security guarantor and principal geopolitical ally. It has invested billions in a nuclear submarine technology sharing pact with the United Kingdom and United States, AUKUS, which has encountered regional (Opens in new window) and domestic pushback (Opens in new window).
Australian voters are increasingly anxious about the state of the world, and while the majority continues to support the alliance with the United States, only 31% (Opens in new window) trust the United States to act responsibly in global affairs, according to the latest Lowy Poll on Australian public opinion. That historically low figure is roughly on par with Australians’ confidence in China (28% (Opens in new window)). Australians express similar levels of trust in Donald Trump (21%) and Xi Jinping (20%).
Vietnam has elevated ties with Australia as part of its multidirectional foreign policy (Opens in new window), through which it seeks to diversify its network of partnerships to reduce reliance on any one country. Strategic autonomy is the goal. Hanoi is averse to alliances and will continue to prioritise its relationship with China, with whom it shares a border and a complicated history (Opens in new window).
Beyond security and geopolitics, Australia and Vietnam enjoy strong people-to-people ties. There were roughly 327,000 Vietnamese-born people living in Australia and more than 36,000 (Opens in new window) Vietnamese students studying in the country in 2025, and Vietnamese is the fourth most commonly spoken language in Australia. Vietnam is the ninth most popular destination for Australian tourists.
Vietnam is Australia’s 10th largest trading partner in goods, while Australia is Vietnam’s seventh largest (Opens in new window) trade partner. Two-way trade in goods surpassed $30 billion (Opens in new window) in 2025, meeting a growth target (Opens in new window) set during Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to Hanoi in 2023. The two sides have also agreed to double (Opens in new window) bilateral investment, which stood at US$1.9 billion (Opens in new window) as of December 2025.
Australia has also committed resources (Opens in new window) to support Vietnam’s green energy transition and pledged nearly $100 million (Opens in new window) in development aid to Vietnam this year.
To Lam’s visit – his first to Australia – will crown these achievements and give an indication of where both sides see the relationship going in the future. As the Labor government continues to prioritise Canberra’s engagement with Southeast Asia and the Pacific, the Australia-Vietnam partnership is likely to grow in importance.
About the author
Hunter Marston
Dr Hunter Marston is the Director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Lowy Institute and Project Lead for the Asia Power Index.
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