Brunei, explained.
F-16s require more delicate operating bases than the MiGs or Sukhois (Jozsef Soos/Getty Images Plus)
Small budgets and limited personnel mean prestige purchases deliver less security than ground-based systems.
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Fighter jets or missiles? Rethinking Brunei’s air defence prioritiesFighter jets or missiles? Rethinking Brunei’s air defence priorities
As the skies over Southeast Asia grow more crowded and contested with advanced military aircraft, small countries can no longer assume that geography and diplomacy alone will guarantee security. For Brunei Darussalam, this raises a difficult but increasingly important question: should it invest in fighter jets to defend its airspace, or focus instead on building a surface-to-air missile air defence system?
At first glance, fighter jets seem like the more traditional and prestigious choice. They symbolise sovereignty, deterrence and modern military capability. Yet for Brunei, a quest for prestige could skew effective defence planning. The real issue is not what looks impressive, but what delivers credible security within tight constraints around personnel, budget, and strategic needs.
Brunei’s circumstances are distinctive. It has a small population of less than half a million people, limited territory, and concentrated critical infrastructure, particularly energy assets such as a refinery and petrochemical complex on Muara Besar Island. It also enjoys relatively good relations with its neighbours, notwithstanding China’s overlapping nine-dash line claims to the South China Sea, and benefits from long-standing defence partnerships with Britain and Singapore.
To state the obvious, an aircraft must be airborne to defend airspace, which means gaps in coverage unless multiple jets are continuously rotated.
These factors suggest that Brunei’s air defence challenge is not about fighting high-intensity air wars, but about preventing airspace violations, attempted coercion, and protecting key assets against limited or unconventional threats, including drones.
Fighter jets offer flexibility for intercept and patrols. However, fighters are also among the most demanding military capabilities to sustain. Jets themselves are expensive platforms, and require pilots, maintenance crews, training pipelines, airbases, logistics chains, and continuous upgrades.
Some types of fighter jets require more investment than others to operate. Take the F-16s for example. They require more delicate operating bases than the MiGs or Sukhois. Runways and taxi routes for an F-16 have to be cleaned as its landing gear is more sensitive and its air intake is located close to the ground, making the aircraft more susceptible to debris on the ground.
For a small air force, even a modest fleet risks becoming a hollow capability. To state the obvious, an aircraft must be airborne to defend airspace, which means gaps in coverage unless multiple jets are continuously rotated. For countries with larger air forces, this is manageable. For Brunei, with limited numbers and personnel, and most likely a small number of fighter jets, this could be a weakness.
Additionally, acquiring fighter jets means that Brunei must also invest in a more capable air defence system, which is currently made up of Very Short-Range (VSHORAD) Mistral system. Without an effective air defence system, the small number of expensive fighter jets on the tarmac are just sitting ducks for cheap drones.
There is also the evolving nature of aerial threats to consider – where the most likely challenges facing Brunei are not squadrons of enemy fighters, but drones and surveillance aircraft. Fighter jets are not always the most cost-effective answer to such threats. In contrast, modern SAM systems, especially when integrated with radars and command networks, are well suited to countering a wide range of targets, including low-flying and unmanned platforms.
This does not mean that SAMs are a silver bullet. Missile systems can be saturated, degraded, or bypassed if poorly integrated. They also lack the political signalling value of fighter jets, which can escort, shadow, and communicate intent in ways missiles cannot. An unidentified aircraft intercepted by a fighter can be warned, escorted, or turned away. A missile battery offers only a binary choice: engage or not. In peacetime, that lack of flexibility matters.
For Brunei, it could prioritise a SAM-centric air defence system rather than attempting to build a miniature version of a full-spectrum air force.
First, the range of its SAM system can be extended by acquiring mid-range ones such as the ASTER SAMP/T NG system with a range of up to 150 kilometres. Second, Brunei can acquire new capabilities to deal with aerial threats such as counter-drone systems. This would reflect a realistic assessment of what it can sustain and what threats it is most likely to face.
Additionally, Brunei could expand its drone capabilities beyond surveillance to include weapon delivery, thus strengthening deterrence and strike capacity.
Another critical factor is partnerships. Brunei’s close defence relationships with Britain and Singapore mean it does not operate in isolation. In a serious contingency, airspace awareness and response could likely involve coordination with its defence partners. This reduces the need for Brunei to independently field every capability at scale.
Ultimately, the fighter-versus-missile debate should be framed as a question of strategy. Buying fighter jets would signal modernisation, but risks overstretching limited resources and delivering limited real coverage.
The smartest choice may not be the one that flies, but the one that quietly convinces others not to test Brunei’s airspace at all.
About the author
Rahman Yaacob
Dr Abdul Rahman Yaacob was a Research Fellow in the Southeast Asia Program at the Lowy Institute.
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