China, explained.
US President Donald Trump makes a toast during a state banquet hosted by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People on 14 May 2026 in Beijing (Getty/Alex Wong)
China, explained.
US President Donald Trump makes a toast during a state banquet hosted by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People on 14 May 2026 in Beijing (Getty/Alex Wong)
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In the face of Chinese certainty, America offers confusion In the face of Chinese certainty, America offers confusion
Having last month designated Taiwan and surrounding areas as “coastal waters (Opens in new window)”, China's confidence in pursuing reunification has been on full display. The alleged inspection of 198 vessels (Opens in new window) around Taiwan and potential mapping of undersea cables, supported by Chinese law enforcement vessels, shows Beijing is not asking for permission. Pair this with President Xi Jinping's security partnership pledge (Opens in new window) to Cambodia — and Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen's statement (Opens in new window) that his nation would resolutely support “complete national reunification” as the "international landscape evolves" — and it is clear China is shaping the region on its own terms.
Beijing has settled on an identity as a peer power, entitled to shape the rules and institutions of the international order in its favour, alongside Washington or despite it. Chinese policymakers increasingly share a coherent understanding of China's place in the world and where it is headed.
Here lies the uncomfortable truth. Since Xi consolidated power, Beijing's story has stayed coherent. Washington's has not.
That identity has been pursued aggressively long before June. Beijing has weaponised its dominance of critical minerals, restricting rare earth exports to pressure Washington (Opens in new window) and Tokyo (Opens in new window). Its forces have rehearsed a blockade (Opens in new window) of Taiwan with live fire and exclusion zones meant to deter American intervention. Its state hackers are pre-positioned (Opens in new window) inside US water, power and communications networks.
In contrast, the summit between President Xi and US President Donald Trump in May displayed an America far less sure of itself.
Against the backdrop of China’s provocations, Trump travelled to Beijing, praised Xi, and said the bilateral relationship was “better than ever before (Opens in new window)”. He even called Taiwan arms sales a “good negotiating chip” (Opens in new window). In effect, Trump gave Beijing the strategic stability it sought (Opens in new window), and gave allies and partners fresh reason to doubt foundational US commitments.
The most revealing takeaway was not what Xi and Trump agreed on but what it exposed about the deeper strategic condition of the two powers.
Whereas Beijing’s narrative, and the actions supporting it, are remarkably consistent, Washington remains caught between competing visions of its role. Is it still the leader of the free world? An offshore balancer focused on preventing the rise of competitors? A nationalist power prioritising domestic renewal?
On some days, Washington appears determined to resist China's rise at all costs. The 2026 National Defense Strategy (Opens in new window), while more restrained than previous strategies, commits the United States to deterring China in the Indo-Pacific. The White House has requested an unprecedented defence budget of US$1.5 trillion (Opens in new window). Exercise Balikatan (Opens in new window), the US-Philippines military exercise, featured more participating nations than ever before and rehearsed territorial defence against a simulated invasion days before the Trump-Xi summit – a not-so-subtle nod towards Taiwan.
But capability without credibility will not deter China, and credibility is the missing part. Trump’s conduct in Beijing was not the calculated ambiguity Washington has long maintained over Taiwan, where deliberate vagueness about its commitment has helped keep the peace. It signals US uncertainty about its very role, with Washington appearing willing to renegotiate the foundations of its position in Asia.
When adversaries question credibility, they test limits. When allies question it, they stop relying on guarantees and begin providing for themselves. Both eventualities risk escalation and miscalculation. Japan finds itself at the centre of this problem. Reports that Trump defended Prime Minister Takaichi (Opens in new window) during the summit suggest continued support for America's closest ally. Yet the broader pattern of American behaviour has left Japan, like many allies, doubting US commitments.
A credible alliance once meant Japanese power was built around American forces, which was legible to Beijing. As US credibility erodes, Japan must build for self-reliance.
Faced with a more assertive China and a less predictable America, Japan is rearming (Opens in new window), loosening constraints on its military role and deepening regional defence ties. It is transforming from a post-war pacifist state sheltered beneath the American security umbrella into an active provider of regional security.
But Japan's transformation springs a trap. Beijing’s aggression and Washington’s pressure have pushed Tokyo to build up its military. However, a credible alliance once meant Japanese power was built around American forces, which was legible to Beijing. As US credibility erodes, Japan must build for self-reliance rather than as a calibrated partner. Uncertain how it would posture against a Japan acting with capabilities and agency outside the alliance, Beijing turns more aggressive still. The cycle becomes self-reinforcing, left unchecked because US credibility has gone missing.
Here lies the uncomfortable truth. Since Xi consolidated power, Beijing's story has stayed coherent, a humiliated great power returning to its rightful place. Washington's has not, and its confusion no longer stops at its own borders. Stripped of a reliable anchor, Japan is compelled to remake its own strategic identity, shedding the pacifist ally it has been for 80 years while still debating what to put in its place. When two of the region's three major powers can no longer say what they are, the one which is sure of its identity sets the terms.
The answer is not for America to become uniformly confrontational towards China nor exclusively accommodating. It is to state clearly that it will hold its position in the region and then pursue it consistently so that allies can build around it rather than around its absence. Until then, additional capabilities will not address the uncertainty that is fuelling instability.
Uncertainty is often more dangerous than hostility. Hard power matters, but strategic identity matters too.
About the authors
David Saultry
David Saultry is an independent consultant specialising in economic security and Indo-Pacific strategy.
Minran Liu
Dr Minran Liu is a Lecturer in the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland.
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